Inequality and poverty fell sharply in many Latin American countries during a decade in which voters in ten countries chose left-leaning leaders. Are these developments related? Using data for 18 Latin American countries, this paper presents econometric evidence that social democratic regimes in Brazil and Chile were more successful at reducing inequality and poverty than the so-called populist regimes of Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Both groups implemented policies to redistribute income, but the social democratic regimes' efforts were more effective. Argentina and Venezuela started the 1990-2008 sample window with lower levels of inequality, so to some extent recent reductions in inequality are a return to "normal" levels (as estimated by fixed effects). Conversely, inequality and poverty in Brazil and Chile fell to historic lows. Second, overall terms of trade shocks were more favorable to Argentina and Venezuela, so part of the drop in inequality can be attributed to commodity price booms. 
Income inequality in Latin America remains high, but there are signs of progress. 1 The past decade has seen inequality and poverty fall in most countries (see Figures 1 and 2 and Helwege and Birch (2007) , Gasparini et al. (2008) , Lustig (2009 ), Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009 ), CEPAL (2010 , Cornia (2010) , Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2010) and UNDP (2010)). 2 Falling poverty and inequality, as it happens, coincides with the election of left of center governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela (see Table 1 ). By 2009, ten countries, accounting for two-thirds of the region's population, had left-leaning governments.
To what extent have these new regimes been responsible for reductions in inequality and poverty? Lustig (2009) and Cornia (2010) find that political regimes matter for inequality reduction. However, Lustig and McLeod (2009) find that while the so-called left populist regimes (as classified by Arnson and Perales, 2007) did reduce inequality, to some extent these reductions are a return to normal levels, where "normal" inequality is estimated by fixed effects. 3 On the other hand, Brazil and Chile, reached historic lows in both inequality and poverty.
Moreover, Argentina and Venezuela were recovering from economic crises and benefited from sharp increases in the price of commodities during the 2002-2008 years (see Figure 5) . That is to say, unless one can control for other factors impacting inequality, one cannot conclude that it was the initiatives and policies of their governments that caused a reduction in poverty and inequality during this period. In fact, Lustig and McLeod find that the inequality-reducing impact of public spending in Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela becomes statistically insignificant once one controls for unobserved (fixed) effects and the commodity price boom.
This paper confirms and extends the results of Lustig and McLeod (2009) on the impact of political regimes on inequality. We reproduce and expand on the results of our previous paper and then test the impact of political regimes for the same 18 Latin American countries on various poverty rates during the period 1989-2008. 4 We "sample" SEDLAC survey data over three year intervals taking into account intermittent surveys in many countries. 5 For inequality, adding fixed effects reversed the impact of political regimes, showing so-called left-populist regimes to be less redistributive and social democratic regimes to be more effective in reducing inequality during 1999-2008, the period during which the leftist governments were voted in. For a wide range of poverty rates published by SEDLAC, the results again favor social democratic regimes.
Controlling for a range of exogenous shocks and policy interventions, poverty falls consistently under these regimes.
Generally, the regression results suggest that terms of trade and growth have substantial impacts on poverty rates, as does social spending. 6 Using a range of poverty measures that include the poverty gap and the poverty gap squared, these results reinforce the findings of Lustig and McLeod (2009) that the social democratic regimes in Brazil, Chile and, to a lesser extent, Uruguay have been more successful than so-called left-populist regimes in reducing poverty and inequality. In fact, the evidence for poverty reduction is robust to a range of estimation methods and poverty measures, as discussed in the next section.
Since the downward trend in inequality and poverty and the new left governments are barely a decade old, with each government group including just a handful of countries, the scope for statistical analysis is limited and many of the issues explored in this paper will not be resolved for many years. Still econometric analysis has an important role in controlling for a host of factors that may impact poverty and inequality in addition to the particular regime.
Data
Researchers are fortunate that Latin America's recent move to the left occurred just after measures of inequality greatly improved. SEDLAC's survey-based poverty and inequality indicators -computed from household survey data tabulated in a relatively uniform fashionrepresent a unique opportunity to test whether political regimes matter. 7 Household surveys became more abundant in the 1990s, but apart from a few countries with annual surveys (Argentina and Brazil, for example), household surveys are intermittent at best. 8 To deal with this problem of intermittent household surveys we follow Barro (2000 Barro ( , 2008 By "sampling" three-year intervals, we are able to cut the missing observations down to about 20%, leaving just under 90 observations once other missing data is considered. 9 Using threeyear intervals in a panel also provides a wider range of political regime measures for testing.
Political regimes are measured in three ways. The first is the 0, 1 dummy proxy. 10 Each regime is allowed a year for its policies to begin effects, so any three year period during which a left leaning government is in office for more than one year gets a 1 and other years get a zero (see Table 1 for the first effective year of each regime). A second measure counts the number of years a given regime has been in power within a particular period (for example, if they are in power two years out of a period of three, they get a two), always skipping the initial year in office because it generally takes some time for a government to implement its own policies. A third regime measure, reported in the last three columns of Table 1 , calculates the cumulative years the regime is in power between 1989 and 2008, again not including the year the government takes office (counting starts with the "effective year" shown in Table 1 ). Lustig and McLeod (2009) report results mainly for the first 0,1 dummy proxy (or the product of this dummy and some policy intervention). This paper on the other hand, uses almost exclusively the second two regime measures that also capture the intensity (years in power), or cumulative impact of a particular regime. 11 The Chavez regime in Venezuela for example, has been in power for over ten years, ample time to implement and refine redistributive policies. Similarly, Chile's social democratic regime exited in March of this year after almost a decade in power.
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Political Regime and Inequality
As mentioned above, Lustig and McLeod (2009) found that political regime matters for inequality reduction. In particular, leftist regimes were found to be more redistributive than nonleftist regimes and, within the left, once one controlled for other variables and fixed effects were taken into account social democratic regimes were found to be more redistributive than so-called populist regimes. In this paper, we check the robustness of these results by using the regime measures described in the previous section and also test whether the results apply to poverty and not just inequality. Table 2 ). One possibility is that these governments may be able to better target the same amount of spending; that is, social spending became more progressive.
14 Finally, equations 1.2, 1.3 and 1.6-1.8 control for a number of external influences, including the terms of trade, remittances and various sorts of exports. Terms of trade improvements tend to reduce inequality, perhaps due to the favorable impact on agriculture and rural wage rates (we return to this in the following section on poverty). Similarly, merchandise exports tend to reduce inequality; however, fuel exports increase inequality. Taken together these results suggest any shift away from fuel and mineral exports (see also Table 4 for poverty impacts) tends to reduce poverty and inequality, potentially due to the widely noted fact that mineral and fuel exports decrease the quality of governance and/or because these sectors are less labor intensive. 15 Broadly, the regression results suggest a recurring pattern. Without fixed effects, socalled left populist regimes appear to reduce inequality relative to the control group of non-left, but social democratic regimes do not. With fixed effects, the impact of political regime is reversed: the social democratic regimes reduce inequality significantly using all three measures vis-à-vis the non-left while left populist regimes have no impact on inequality. Note also that terms of trade and the composition of trade become much more significant with the fixed effects estimates. The impact of per capita income, which does not change dramatically over this period, gets lost in the fixed effects as well. Public consumption spending remains regressive with or without fixed effects, though having a social democratic regime tempers these regressive impacts somewhat. Hence, the observed post 2000 fall in inequality for Argentina and Venezuela can be interpreted as a return to typically lower levels of inequality for these countries. For Brazil and Chile, on the other hand, inequality fell to historic lows, partially reversing long term institutional factors that have, in the past, made inequality higher than average in these countries. but remains higher than it was in the early 1990s). In both Chile and Brazil inequality levels ends lower than they were in the early 1990s: hence the social democratic countries appear to have broken with the past while Venezuela and Argentina have returned toward previously recognized lower levels of inequality. As it happens, post 2000 terms of trade trends were also much more favorable for Argentina, Venezuela and Bolivia (see Figure 5 ). Chile and Brazil experienced favorable movements in their terms of trade, but ones that were not nearly as dramatic. Terms of trade movements contributed to the reduction of inequality in all three groups of countries, according to the fixed effects estimates reported in Table 2 (see also Table 4 and 5 for poverty impacts). However, the windfalls for so-called left populist governments were higher than for both the social democratic regimes and for the rest of Latin America (our control group).
Political Regime and Poverty
Inequality can be reduced by redistributing income from the rich to the middle class, or by raising the share of the bottom two quintiles and in the process reducing poverty. Table 4 regresses the log change in moderate and extreme poverty (headcount) on a similar set of variables used in Table 2 , where the dependent variables are the Gini coefficients.
Using changes makes fixed effects dissappear. In the case of poverty (as opposed to inequality), fixed effects did not change the results so they can be left out. The reason for this is because the initial level of poverty is not key to the result (while it is for inequality). The results for changes in moderate and extreme poverty show a pattern similar to that for the fixed effects regressions reported as eqs. 1.4 to 1.8 in Table 2 . Social democratic regimes tend to be more effective than left populist regimes in reducing both poverty rates. 19 Again changes in social spending reduces poverty among people living in both moderate and extreme poverty, but has a larger impact on the latter, as expected. Inflation also raises both poverty rates, again hitting the bottom quintile hardest (though low poverty rates tend to make log changes in poverty rates larger, see Lustig and McLeod, 1997, Appendix 3A) . Remittances, manufacturing exports, and especially terms of trade changes reduce poverty, though manufacturing exports only impact extreme poverty.
Raising the minimum wage increases moderate poverty which suggests that the negative effect on employment may dominate over the positive so-called "light-house" effect.
20 Table 5 provides additional tests, calculating the impact of political regimes on moderate poverty using the same approach used for the Gini coefficient in Table 3 and in Lustig and McLeod (2009) . The results for poverty rates are more robust in the sense that the signs and significance of the regime impacts do not depend on the estimation method (i.e., the use of fixed effects). The key difference between the Since overall public spending in Latin America is regressive, reallocating fiscal spending to social programs (as defined by CEPAL) reduces poverty faster than increasing social spending alone. Inflation and the minimum wage also have more robust impacts on moderate poverty (as opposed to overall inequality). As in Table 4 , for changes in moderate poverty, the level of the minimum wage tends to increase moderate poverty with or without fixed effects. Inflation also has a robust negative impact on moderately poor households.
Finally, Table 6 tests a single new specification across the full range of poverty measures provided by the SEDLAC database. Instead of using first differences or fixed effects, we condition on the initial level of each poverty measure (picking up the fixed effects). The last row of Table 6 summarizes the mean of each poverty measure for this group of countries (Uruguay is dropped, though the main results are not affected by adding it). The lowest mean poverty rate is 14% for extreme poverty, followed by 23% for the $2.50/day poverty line. Both the $4/day line and the moderate poverty line average about 40% (though they are computed using both the same and different poverty lines in each country). In terms of the incidence of poverty (the number of poor over the total population), if anything social democratic regimes reduce poverty in the bottom quintile more than for the second quintile (captured by eqs. 6.2 and 6.3). Public spending on social programs also seems to reduce the headcount ratio, even those below the lowest "extreme" poverty line, though the impact on the more uniform $2.50/day poverty line is not significant. Finally, both the terms of trade and overall economic growth (per capita income) seem to be reaching the poorest groups.
The poverty gap and the poverty gap squared measure not only the number of poor below each poverty line but also the depth of poverty (or average incomes). The poverty gap squared places more weight on the poorest of the poor. Surprisingly, political regime still matters even at the lower $2.50/day poor groups, but social spending does not seem to increase the average income of the poor or the poorest (note the impact of social spending becomes insignificant). If anything, the impact of economic growth and terms of trade changes increase when we focus on the average incomes of the poor and the poorest. However, the evidence presented in Table 6 suggests that the poorest groups have not only benefited from cumulative rule by left populist governments, but may even have lost out a bit during the time period in the countries considered here.
The results for poverty rates in Tables 4-6 Taken as a whole however, these results suggest left populist governments have been less successful than social democratic governments in reducing poverty. Exactly how social democratic governments have helped the poor needs to be clarified. Social spending seems to be important, but it is not the entire story. Social democratic governments appear to better target existing levels of spending, and reallocating spending toward social programs has a strong impact. Future research along these lines must test a number of other measures that may be helping the poorest groups under social democratic regimes: access to eduction, targeted conditional cash transfers and labor intensive exports (both Brazil and Chile are relatively successful exporters of manufactures, for example).
Conclusion
To summarize, the panel estimates for 18 countries with adequate data for the period 1989 to 2008 suggest political regimes do matter for inequality outcomes. However, the results for so-called populist and social democratic regimes are different: even controlling for the commodity price boom, poverty and inequality fell faster under the social democratic regimes in Brazil, Chile and -to a lesser extent-Uruguay. The inequality and poverty-reducing impact of the left-populist regimes in Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela vanishes once one controls for unobserved effects and the commodity price boom. Historically, Argentina and Venezuela had lower levels of inequality and poverty (especially extreme poverty) than other Latin American countries, so a return to "normal" levels of inequality also helps explain part of the sharp post 2002 fall in inequality both countries experienced (as measured by the Gini coefficient, and in particular when considering the extreme poverty rate, see Figures 2, 3 and 4) . Further analysis should allow us to separate out the impact of public policy (via education spending for example), but the evidence suggests that social democratic regimes have been able to reduce poverty faster than left populist regimes (as measured by a wide range of poverty measures). Even controlling for other factors, the evidence for social democratic regimes is more conclusive: they have been more effective than non-left and left populist governments in reducing poverty and inequality, although exactly how they have done this is a topic for further research.
Having said this, should so-called left populist regimes be given credit for reducing inequality to pre-crisis or historic norms? They should. Once inequality increases, it may well be difficult to return to pre-crisis levels. (2.9) Net barter terms of trade (log) Argentina 
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